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Abstract  
Accounting literature on the reliability of financial information presents several 
mathematical models whose purpose is to identify the existence of values 
manipulations. The phenomenon is described as earnings management and presents a 
broad discussion concerning the search for suitable models to measure the distortions in 
values. In this respect, the present paper aims to compare the ability of two versions of 
the same mathematical model of  classify the risk of earnings manipulation in a 
discriminant way. 
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1 Introduction  
 
The paper aims to compare the ability of two Beneish models, the M-score5 
and the modified M-scoreIt, to detect earnings management. These methods 
have not been evaluated by prior research, and it is unclear which type of 
model dominates, as each models relies on the same assumptions and only 
empirically we can verify which of them is more descriptively valid. 
Davidson, Stickney and Weil (1987) [1] define the earnings management as 
the process by which managers, staying within accepted accounting 
principles, try to get at a certain desired level of profit to be marked on the 
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outside. Healy and Wahlen (1999) [2] state that earnings management 
occurs when “managers use their own judgment in reporting the financial 
data and in structuring transactions in order to alter financial reports to 
deceive stakeholders on the fundamental economic performance the 
company or to influence the consequences of contracts that depend on 
accounting data reported”. This perspective focuses on the matter to the 
judgment of the managers in the definition of financial data. Technically, 
earnings management activities include a spectrum of activities ranging 
from conservative accounting fraud through aggressive accounting and the 
neutral, through a wide range of accounting choices [3]. There are several 
ways in which managers can apply judgment to influence the financial 
reports. For example by means of the estimates that relate to the final value 
and duration of a certain good, or about possible future expenses are not yet 
done. For this reason this phenomenon is linked to the discretionary-
accruals components present in the financial statement. Literature on 
earnings management has extensively examined a set of models to estimate 
discretionary accruals. These models range from the simple mathematical 
equation, in which total accruals are used as a measure of discretionary 
accruals, to sophisticated regression models, which decompose accruals into 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components and aim to forecast the 
presence of fraud and financial distress.  Conversely, other models consider 
only  a set of interrelated accounting ratios, comparing the values among 
several years in order to find some abnormalities. Attention to earnings 
management policies comes from the social and financial consequences 
which produces the distortion of information on the financial results of the 
company. Famous scandals of major companies are proof, for that reason 
more than thirty years research on mathematical methods able to adequately 
identify the phenomenon showed continued growth. Prior studies concluded 
that managers use discretionary accruals to convey their private information 
to investors, examining the time-series of discretionary-accruals (Hansen, 
1996) [4]  or the association between stock returns, discretionary accruals 
and nondiscretionary earnings [5]. Several studies are focused on listed 
firms or on financial statements based on US GAAP. In this study we 
observe a sample of 99 Italian academic spin offs, with homogeneous 
activity and omogeneous accounting rule system. These firms are mainly 
small and medium and not listed, for these reasons all the statistic models 
linked to market price of equity, stock volatility and US GAAP principles 
may be inadequate in detecting earnings management practices. In the next 
section we describe the main attribute of academic spin offs, followed by 
the concept and the consequences of earnings management and from the 
properties of Beneish model. Descriptive statistics, the comparative 
calculation and the regression analysis will be presented in section 5. 
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Finally we drawn some conclusion about the ability of two versions of 
Beneish model in detecting earnings management within Italian SME. 
 
2  Academic spin-offs: an overview 
 
The current improvement of the spin-off phenomenon in Europe has provided a 
treasured approach to spread new technologies and knowledge [6], driving up 
the business prospects for the academics and other players involved in projects 
directed to increase the outcome of the university scientific research [7;8]. 
Simultaneously, the spin-off process from a parent organization, especially from 
universities, has recently received growing attention both from the academic 
literature [9;10;11;12] and in the practice [13]. Furthermore, thanks to their 
capability in generating wealth and inspiring the development of scientific 
knowledge, policy-makers have showed an emergent interest in the academic 
spin-offs, considering them an active tool to encourage the development of 
knowledge-based economies in different institutional settings [14;15] so that 
their creation has become a crucial matter for policy-makers all around the 
world [16]. This is also due to the fact that either academicians, policy-makers 
either practitioners agree about the role played by universities as one of the main 
sources of innovations and their successful diffusion in the society [17;18]. 
Indeed, several scholars [19;20;21; 22] underline that the formation of a firm by 
a research institution is an outstanding method to commercialize the outcomes 
of the public research, as well as in contributing to the economic and social 
welfare and to the regional development. Scholars usually highlight the 
eminence of the foundation and diffusion of knowledge by universities as a 
noteworthy driving force for technological innovation in an economy, both at 
local and at national level [23]. The existing literature remarks that the new 
model of "open innovation", embraced by numerous organizations with the aim 
to contribute to the dissemination of knowledge, [24;25] has become a critically 
method in cooperating either with New Technology-Based Firms (NTBFs)  
either with scientific foundations, such as academics spin-offs, which provide 
new research settings and a multidisciplinary approach for the development of 
innovation processes [26;27]. Academic spin-offs (ASOs) are firms generated in 
order to exploit knowledge originated within universities. More specifically, the 
current literature defines academic spin-offs as “those companies that germinate 
from a University, where a group of researchers composes the entrepreneurial 
unit aiming at the exploitation of skills and results from the research developed 
within the University” [28] or “company composed by individuals who were 
former employees of the parent organization, and where the technology and the 
academic inventors may spin-off both from the institution, or where the 
technology spins out from the institution but the academic inventor is employed 
in the University, or, lastly, where only the technology spins out, while the 
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academic inventor does not maintain relationships with the new firm but may 
have equity” [29]. 
The establishment of the knowledge/technology employed by an academic spin 
off is a multi-stage process. Generally, literature identified three main models of 
academic spin-off creation and development. In the first model, Ndonzuau, 
Pirnay, and Surlemont [30] recognized four central stages in the growth of 
academic spin-offs: i) creating a sustainable business idea, ii) converting the 
idea into a business process, iii) building a firm and iv) contributing value to 
customers, employees, investors and all other stakeholders. These four stages 
are reciprocally dependent, since choices made in the earlier stages may 
effective influence the later stages. The second model, developed by Shane [7], 
embraces five stages in typifying a distinctive process to build an academic spin 
off. The first state is merely academic but the model also allows for tangential 
technologies that have the prospective to easily enable the development of new 
products. In cases where the researcher considers that their new technology is an 
invention which can be commercialized, then, they reveal it to the Technology 
Transfer Offices (TTO). Next, in the third stage, the prospective for intellectual 
property protection is estimated and a patent application may be made. Based on 
the limited monopoly via the patent, the TTO can either license the technology 
to a foundation firm or the researcher may start an academic start-up. Moving 
from the models by Ndonzuau et al. and Shane, Vohora, Wright and Lockett 
[31] provided a new perspective on the expansion of academic spin offs. Their 
model also has five stages, but it stresses four pivotal junctures that must be 
overlapped before transitioning to the next stage: i) Research (Opportunity 
recognition), ii) Opportunity framing (Entrepreneurial commitment), iii) Pre-
organization (Threshold of credibility), iiii) Re-orientation, iiiii) Threshold of 
sustainability (Sustainable returns). Considering the above arguments, it is 
worthwhile to observe that the awareness demonstrated by literature in the 
success factors and supporting mechanisms of university entrepreneurship, 
through ASOs, has increased in the last years [15]. Indeed, several scholars 
[32;33] deal with the elements fostering their creation and growth, which are 
classified into different categories. A first category refers to the institutional 
supporting measures [26] such as government laws, financial and non-financial 
incentives. A second type is associated to university policies [34] such as 
business plan competitions, spin-off regulations, university business incubators. 
The third, instead, refers to the external critical factor of the spin off activity 
[35] such as, for example, entrepreneurial support mechanisms, venture capital, 
science parks, proximity to parent organization and prospects available from 
industry. Finally, a fourth type is related to the technology features [36], e.g. the 
prospective of commercialization, the appropriability and the value to 
customers. Often scholars [37] associate features affecting the growth dynamics 
of academic spin-offs with three different levels of analysis, employed to 
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investigate the phenomenon with a more comprehensive approach: micro, meso 
and macro levels. Regarding the first level of analysis, the macro one, the focus 
is on the national systems of innovation and, above all, on the role that policy-
makers may have in the foundation of academic spin-offs [26;32]. Hence, the 
studies on the creation of academic spin-offs focus on the occurrence of venture 
capitalists, legal protection of innovations, regional infrastructures and on the 
business environment in which the universities are regulated but, at the same 
time, they are less interested in what is happening within the parent 
organization, which is the university. That’s the reason why the theoretical 
framework that helps to explain the effects generated at the macro level of 
analysis – particularly as regards the NTBFs, of which the ASOs are a specific 
typology – is the Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship applied to 
the regional context [38]. As for the meso level of analysis, this is focused on 
the study of university and the TTO and tries to identify the fostering 
mechanisms or factors by which universities promote the effective 
creation/development  of  academic start-ups [39;40], as well as, it tries to 
explore the success of spinning out processes such as a university technology 
transfer mechanism. Frequently, the theoretical framework used to carry out this 
type of analysis is the Resource-Based View, according to which internal factors 
define or influence the formation of academic spin-offs. Lastly, the last level of 
analysis, the micro one, concerns the role played by the individual 
characteristics of  the entrepreneurs or the managerial team, jointly with their 
social ties, in encouraging the spinout foundation process. In this case, the 
theoretical framework of reference involves the field of Entrepreneurial 
Theories [41;42], which studies the individual characteristics, in conjunctions  
with the Resource-Based View which explores the personal assets influencing 
and affecting the foundation of the academic spin-offs [43]. Following a 
theoretical approximation, the first two levels of analysis can be attributed to 
those ones which the literature defines university fostering mechanisms of 
academic entrepreneurship [26;32;35], while the second may be included in 
those contextual elements which form the local context factors in the 
development of the academic spin-offs [15]. 
 
 
3 Earnings management in SMEs 
 
Earnings management can be loosely defined as a strategy of generating 
accounting earnings, which “is accomplished through managerial discretion over 
accounting choices and operating cash flows” [44]. It occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
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performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend 
on reported accounting numbers [45]. Earnings management is an umbrella for 
acts that affect the reported accounting earnings or their interpretation, starting 
from production and investment decisions that partly determine the underlying 
economic earnings, going through the choice of accounting treatment and the 
size of accruals when preparing the periodic reports, and ending in actions that 
affect the interpretation of the reported earnings. Not all earnings management is 
misleading. Investors, for example, prefer to separate persistent earnings from 
one-time shocks. Firms that manage earnings in order to allow investors to 
better distinguish between the two components do not distort earnings. On the 
contrary, they enhance the informational value of their reported earnings. Thus, 
depending on the will to signal of hide the short or long term performance, it can 
be beneficial, pernicious or neutral [46]. The studies usually relate the level and 
type of the earning management adopted by firms with the interests of the key 
players on the financial accounting scene, which can be grouped into three main 
categories: management, users and gatekeepers or monitors [46]. Management 
reports earnings, users use earnings as an input to their decision making, and 
gatekeepers provide valuable signals to other users regarding the credibility and 
the informational value of the reported earnings [47]. The literature about 
earnings management has mainly explored the effect of these key players in 
large firms because financial information published by these firms is easily 
accessible. Large companies are generally listed companies with publicly 
available financial information while SMEs are subject to less demand for 
financial information. In the last years. the literature is focusing on the level and 
type of earnings management in SMEs as a result of intuition that firm size 
affects the incentives to this practice. There should be a little interest of 
management in managing earnings in SMEs for its own advantages because 
small companies are less subject to agency problems, especially when 
shareholders and managers are the same people, like in family firms. However, 
incentives to manage earnings also exist in SMEs when the company needs 
external financing, for example from banks. Also tax purposes are often 
advanced to explain accounting choices in small firms, especially when 
alignment between financial and tax reporting is high [48]. On one hand, several 
studies tried to explain the objectives of financial reporting in SMEs. Lavigne 
[49] shows that, according to the managers of Canadian SMEs, financial 
reporting respond to both internal management and tax purposes. He shows that 
structural factors, such as firm size, ownership structure and debt also influence 
accounting policies. In the same context of Canadian firms, Maingot and Zeghal 
[50] find that the objectives of financial reporting are linked to taxes and debt. 
The performance of the firm can also influence financial reporting. Saboly [51] 
shows that managers of small distressed firms can manage earnings to influence 
stakeholders. In Australia, McMahon [52] finds that financial reporting quality 
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in SMEs is associated with firm size, but not with performance and growth.  On 
the other hand, literature has also focused on the issue of earnings 
management’s intensity and typology in comparative terms between SME’s and 
large firms. Moses [53] finds evidence that large firms have a bigger incentive 
to smooth earnings than small firms and Michaelson, James, and Charles [54] 
also find consistent evidence. Differently,  Albrecht and Richardson [55] find 
evidence that large firms have less incentive to smooth earnings than small 
firms. Burgstahler and Dichev [56] analyze the impact of earnings management 
on the company's losses, in a sample of 300 companies and the results show that 
large firms and small ones manage their earnings in order to avoid small losses 
or small profits decline. Rangan [57] finds a significant relationship between 
earnings management and performance of experienced equity offerings. He 
suggests that older and largest firms were maneuvering the current accruals to 
exaggerate the earnings of the experienced equity offerings. Degeorge, Patel, 
and Zeckhauser [58] indicate that large companies manipulate the earnings of 
the company to avoid the negative earnings. Lee and Choi [59] also find that 
firm size is a variable that could influence a firm's tendency to manage earnings: 
smaller firms are more likely to manage earnings to avoid reporting losses than 
larger firms. Barton and Simko [60] show that big companies face more 
influence to get the analysts’ demands to manage earnings more effectively. 
Nelson, Elliott, and Tarpley [61] showed that sometimes auditors might ignore 
the earnings management of large sized firms. He argues that, since audit fees 
increase with client size, the probability of adjustments in the financial 
statements by the auditor becomes lower when increasing the client size. Ching, 
Firth, and Rui, [62] examine that whether unrestricted current accruals 
forecasted the returns and earnings performance and resulted that larger firms 
manipulate current accruals to overstate earnings than the small sized firms. 
Siregar and Utam [63] find inconsistent evidence with regard to the impact of 
firm size on type of earnings management while Persons [64] analysis of frauds 
reveals evidence of more fraudulent activity in smaller firms. The contributions 
above outlined testify that literature do not converge towards a homogeneous 
scenario and demonstrate that there is still much to say about SME’s propensity 
to earnings management. 
 
4 Beneish Manipulation-Score for Italian ASOs 
 
Literature on earnings management examines the amount of discretionary and 
non discretionary accruals within the financial statement, considering these 
values the main sources of manipulation. The pioneering Healy [65] 
contribution assumes that profits derive from a cash part and accruals, the 
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increase of which denotes the presence of a not really cashed income and hence 
more maneuverable. Accruals include revenue and expenditure that have taken 
place in a certain period, but that did not generate a cash flow during the same 
period. Discretionary accruals are measured as the accruals that cannot be 
explained by a change in sales and the level of fixed assets, thus, their measure 
will capture changes in any number of expenses, some revenues, and changes in 
various working capital accounts. Marquardt and Wiedman [66] demonstrate 
that firms issuing equity manage accruals by increasing revenue and decreasing 
depreciation expense. In other researches [67] emerge that changes to pension 
assumptions, inventory method, depreciation method and estimates, as well as 
LIFO liquidations are used to manage earnings. Other researches associate 
manipulation of results sudden adoption of more favourable credit terms, the 
increase in product inventories, the increase in discretionary spending such as 
research and development, advertising and maintenance [68]. As a result of the 
earnings management research the analyst will understand that some firms 
manipulate accounting numbers to manage earnings and that the vehicles chosen 
for manipulation vary in predictable ways. Other than the earnings number, 
however, it is not known in any given context which numbers are likely to have 
been manipulated. DeAngelo et al. [69] state that abnormal changes in accruals 
between one year and the other are associated with intentional distortion of 
income, related to the managers’ desire to increase their profit margins in order 
to achieve their goals. There are different models that estimate accruals, based 
on statistic index or accounting ratios.  The most popular models are the 
DeAngelo Model (1986), Healy Model (1985), Jones Model (1991) and the 
Modified Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995), the Industry Model 
[45], the Cross-Sectional Jones Model [70] and the Beneish M-score [71]. The 
first seven models attempt to measure the earning manipulation through the ratio 
between the discretionary and non discretionary accruals and three of them, the 
Industry Model, the Healy Model and the Jones Model, are estimated over an 
eight-year period ending just prior to the event year. In this analysis we use the 
Beneish model adapted to Italian SMEs by Giunta, Bini and Dainelli [72], which 
consider the disparate effects on accruals played by the Italian accounting 
principles. Beneish M-Score is a mathematical model that adopts some financial 
metrics to identify the extent of a company’s earnings. This model observes the 
value alteration phenomena in non-listed companies, where value emerges 
mainly from the financial statements. The original Manipulation score (M-
score) includes an intercept and eight variables that capture the financial 
statement distortions that can result from earnings manipulation or that indicate 
a predisposition to engage in earnings manipulation [73]. One advantage of the 
M-score is that the treatment sample consists of firm that have indeed managed 
earnings and that determination is independent of abnormal accrual models [71]. 
The formula is as follows:  
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1) M-score8= -4,840 + 0.920DSRI + 0.528GMI + 0.0404AQI + 0.892SGI + 
0.115DEPI – 0.172SGAI  - 0.327LVGI + 4.679TATA 
Days Sales in Receivables Index (DSRI) measures the ratio of days that 
sales are in accounts receivable in a year compared to that of a prior year and an 
index higher than 1 describes the increased percentage of non cash sales 
compared to the prior year. A disproportionate increase in accounts receivable 
may be indicative of inflated revenues. Gross Margin Index (GMI) measures the 
variation of gross operating margin and when it’s greater than 1 shows that the 
profit has worsened in the period under review with the consequence that the 
firm is likely to manipulate its revenues. Asset Quality Index (AQI) is the ratio 
of current (CA) and non current asset (property, plants and equipments-PPE) to 
total assets in one year to a prior year. An increase in AQI index may represent 
additional expenses that are being capitalized to preserve profitability [71]. 
Indeed, an index greater than 1indicates that the firm has potentially increased 
its cost deferral or increased its intangible assets, implementing a potential 
earnings manipulation. Sales Growth Index (SGI) is a measure of growth in 
revenue and if it’s greater than 1 there is a positive growth in the year under 
review. Callen et al. [74] show that the likelihood of revenue manipulation is 
increasing with the credit loss ratio, leverage and with the volatility of equity 
returns and with the ratio of accounts receivable to sales. Depreciation Index 
(DEPI) is the ratio of depreciation expense and gross value of PPE in one year 
over a prior year. An index above 1 could be a reflection of an upward 
adjustment of the useful life of PPE. Leverage Index (LVGI) measures the ratio 
of total debt to total assets, describing the long-term risks of a company. An 
index of greater than 1 is interpreted as an increase in the gearing of the 
company and for that matter exposed to manipulation. Total Accruals to Total 
Assets Index (TATA) measures the quality of cash flows of the firms. The total 
accruals metric is computed as change in current assets (except cash and 
equivalent) less depreciation and the current portion of debts. An increasing 
degree of accruals as part of total assets would indicate a higher chance of 
manipulation. Another version of the index was empirically derived from the 
University of Lille with another European companies samples [72]. In this case 
only 5 variables were significant for the purpose of earning manipulation. The 
formula assumes the following definition: 
 
2) M-score5 = -6,065 + 0.823DSRI + 0.906GMI + 0.593AQI + 0.717SGI + 
0.107DEPI 
 
Empirically, when the M-score5 is greater than -2.22 is high the probability of 
earning manipulation. Some of these variables (DSRI, GMI and TATA) 
describe the firms’ ability to generate cash and profits from their business 
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operations. Two of them (SGI and LVGI) try to capture the company’s skills 
and motivations that could lead to the manipulation of accounting rules. Finally, 
the others (AQI, DEPI and SGAI) evaluate investments in assets of the firm and 
the ability to control costs. The application of models based on the estimation of 
accounting parameters affected by accounting principles applicable in Italy 
requires a revision in the calculation of the indicators and in their selection. 
Applying the initial formula to a sample of Italian listed companies, Giunta et al. 
[73] found a large number of false positives and a predictive power of less than 
47%. For this reason the model has been adapted to the Italian system, 
dominated by SMEs who base their financial statements on the  Civil Code 
rules, on national accounting principles (OIC) based on the principle of prudent 
estimates of costs and provisions. Readjustment affected the structure and the 
number of variables and related weights. SGI and TATA indicators were 
removed considering their low significance in the sample for the earning 
manipulation event. Therefore, the formula that we could consider for Italian 
SMEs is the following [72]: 
 
3) M-scoreIt = - 6,2273 + 0.448DSRI + 0.1871GMI + 0.2001AQI + 
0.2819DEPI + 0.6288LVGI 
The variable weights were estimated using the maximum likelihood analysis, 
starting from a sample of manipulative society compared with a control group of 
non-manipulative firms. In this case, the cut-off value for M-score is -4.14. 
Giunta et al. (2014) shows that with this value the model reduces the errors for 
false positive at level 7.14% and correctly identifies the 92% of manipulations. 
Table 1 describes the formula for each variable considered for M-score; in this 
analysis we compare M-score5 and M-scoreIt.  
 
Table 1 – Variables description  
 
Code  Name Formula  
DSRI Days Sales in 
Receivables Index 
(Accounts receivablest/Salest) / (Accounts receivablest-1/Salest-
1) 
GMI Gross Margin 
Index 
[(Revenues t-1 – Costs of Goods sold t-1)/ Revenues t-1 ] / 
[(Revenues t – Costs of Goods sold t)/ Revenues t ] 
AQI Asset Quality 
Index 
{1 – [(CA t +PPE t)/Total assets t] } / {1 – [(CA t-1 +PPE t-
1)/Total assets t-1]}  
where    CA = Current assets  
             PPE = property, plant and equipment  
DEPI Depreciation Index [Depreciation and amortizationt-1 / (Depreciation and 
amortizationt-1 + PPE t-1)] / [Depreciation and amortizationt / 
(Depreciation and amortizationt + PPE t)] 
LVGI Leverage Index (Total Debts t / Total Assets t) / (Total Debts t-1 / Total Assets 
t-1) 
SGI Sales growth Index Revenuest / Revenuest-1 
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5 Research model and results 
 
In order to analyse the effects of Beneish model in signalling the manipulative 
firms, the research observes a sample of Italian academic spin offs born in 2004 
and 2005 and existing until 2015, taken from the database of national network of 
Italian academic spin offs and patents (Netval). This analysis considers the 
performances during the period 2009-2010, just after the beginning of the 
financial crisis, that is considered a pivotal event for earning managements. Data 
were collected through Infocamere database (the national register of Italian 
companies), AidaBvdep system and from company websites. We excluded the 
inactive firms, those with no financial statements after the 2010, distressed firms 
and others in liquidations. The final sample includes 99 firms, around the 12% 
of those academic spin offs existing on Netval database in 2010 and 66% of 
those born in 2004-2005. The variation index of the net income in the period t-t-1 
is the proxy used to estimate the manipulation risk. Descriptive statistics in 
Table 2 show the higher volatility of GMI and SGI indicators that affect the 
value of M-score5. The mean value of In table 2 we compare the M-score5 
model with M-scoreIt. Always for SGI index, the median value exceeds the unit, 
showing for it a high associated risk of earnings manipulation related to the 
revenues management. 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
 
  No. MIN MAX MEAN STDDEV MEDIAN 
DSRI 99 0 16.61 0.744572 1.957968 0 
GMI 99 -83.2 4268.56 42.71517 429.198 0.743818 
AQI 99 0 18.45 1.643234 2.580883 0.991328 
SGI 99 0 4913.6 50.7929 493.7183 1.079366 
DEPI 99 0 3.11 1.043452 0.53463 0.927252 
LVGI 99 0 5.9 1.086904 0.711245 0.984005 
M-score5 99 -76.7 7385.16 70.75233 742.7017 -3.27986 
M-scoreIt 99 -18.41 793.47 3.405278 80.24861 -4.73452 
VarProfit t/t-1 99 -8979.53 26.95 -0.03542 0.396172 0.450448 
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Table 3 – Comparative analysis for M-score 
 
 
  High Risk Low risk 
 
M-score5 33% 66% 
 
M-scoreIt 31% 69% 
 
According to model based on 5 variables, the 33% of the sample presents a high 
risk of earnings manipulation, while the M-scoreIt identifies a lower number of 
potentially manipulative firms, despite it assumes a lower threshold value. 
Thinking about possible sources of bias, we may assume that the variable with 
the greatest impact on the difference of the two scores is associated with 
fluctuations in sales revenue (SGI), considering the high standard deviation that 
takes in the sample. The reasons can be adduced both to the fact that SGI is not 
scaled by total assets, as happens for the other and also for the nature of 
academic spin offs. In fact, the instability in sales is quite common and frequent 
in these firms, whereas many of them have to wait long periods before 
concluding the development of research and bring to market the goods obtained. 
However, the gap between the two indices is rather small, is to be concluded 
that the classification to which they lead is quite similar, therefore emerges not a 
significant contribution from the M-scoreIt model in discriminating 
manipulative companies compared to the M-score5 based on accruals. 
Considering that the Beneish M-score is a probabilistic model, its limit is that 
the ability to detect potential fraud is not with 100% accurancy. For this reasons 
in this analysis we consider only the risk of profit manipulation, linking the 
variation of net income to the M-score variables, examining the linear regression 
as follows: 
 
4) VarProfit = β0 + β1DSRI+ β2GMI +  β3AQI+ β4DEPI +  β5LVGI + β6SGI + 
εi 
The stepwise procedure (Table 4) shows that only the AQI is significant to 
explain the variation of net income in the period observed. AQI in the sample 
assumes a mean value greater than 1 and a median value close to 1 that could 
indicate that the academic spin offs have potentially increased the deferred cost. 
The negative coefficient in the regression analysis shows that when the firms 
increase the capitalization of cost related to intangible assets, such as R&D 
costs, the variability of profit decreases between one period and another, leaving 
to hypothesize that the budgeting of costs related to R&D could ensure a certain 
stability in the level of profit. Therefore, the systematic capitalization of these 
deferred costs would allow to homogenize the income levels over time, leaving 
to assume the existence of an earnings management policy.  
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Table 4 – Regression analysis 
Model   
non-standardized 
coefficients 
standardized 
coefficients 
t Sig. B std.error Beta 
1 Costant 64,384 102,790   ,626 ,533 
AQI -92,196 33,884 -,264 -2,721 ,008 
Stepwise selection: prob F in <=0,050; prob F out>=0,100 
 
Model R R-Square 
R-Square 
Adj Std. error 
1 ,264(a) ,070 ,060 866,29650 
a.  (Constant), AQI 
 
 
6 Conclusion  
 
Literature on earning management has largely focused on methods able to detect 
manipulative companies, minimizing classification errors, considering that the 
inadequacy of the calculation method can lead to important social and economic 
consequences. If on one hand the statistic accrual prediction models neglect 
some operational dynamics of the company and don’t describe in a significant 
way the phenomena when the samples are small, on the other hand, the 
accounting models are less stringent, and built on the basis of accounting 
standards adopted in selected countries. This paper assumes that in earnings 
management analysis is important consider the contingent features of the 
business, of corporate governance, the economic situation and the specific 
accounting rules of each country. These items affect the business trend of the 
firms, influencing the accounting policies and favouring opportunistic 
behaviour. Applying the Beneish M-score model to a sample of Italian SME, in 
order to detect earnings management, rather than forecasting fraud and financial 
distress,  we didn’t found deep differences between the adjusted version of M-
scoreIt and the simplified  model for the European firms. Regression analysis 
also confirmed that the typicality of economic activity, from which descend the 
investment decisions, is the most effective on the variability of profit margins so 
for the purpose of detection of earnings management should be considered also 
expressive variables of this situation. An appropriate weighting system could 
adequately quantify the impact of sectoral differences, as well as the company 
size, then the complexity of corporate governance.  
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